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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the impact of regional stereotyping on inward-FDI
by introducing well known elements of economics of race and gender in the labor
market.We use the Oaxaca decomposition to explore di¤erences in FDI inows
between developing regions of the world. Our analysis spanning 94 developing
countries from 6 di¤erent regions of the world over the years 1990-2002 shows
there are ongoing and signicant regional di¤erences in the FDI ows, even after
controlling for well know determinants of FDI location choice. The MENA region
exhibits unexplained, adverse di¤erences compared to all other regions except for
Sub-Saharan Africa.
JEL Classication: F21, D73, Z13
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Middle East and North Africa Institu-
tions, Stereotyping
"Oh, East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at Gods great Judgment Seat."
Rudyard Kipling
This paper embarks on the observation that East and West have indeed met when
the foreign direct investment (FDI) inows in Latin America and South East Asia are
considered. Yet, they have not in the past and are not likely to in the very near future
when it comes to the Middle East and the entire Africa.
In 2004, 44% of the FDI inows were into developing countries. Compared to the
25% in 1980, this is a signicant increase in the share of world FDI inows hosted by
developing countries. Within developing countries, the lion share goes to the Latin
America and East Asia. The Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) lack far behind. For example, the share of MENA in foreign direct investment
stocks in developing countries was only 7.5% and in foreign direct investment inows
was 7.8% in year 2004. Among all 335,338 foreign a¢ liates in developing countries, only
14,274 of them operate in the Middle East and North Africa.
Is there really a potential for FDI ows to the MENA region? The answer is not
at all no. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has
started benchmarking inward FDI performance and potential, ranking countries by how
they do in attracting inward direct investment in early 1990s. In all the years these
indices were calculated, at least half of the countries in the MENA region exhibited high
FDI potential but performed very poorly when it came to attracting FDI from abroad.
Thus, it is inevitable to ask the question why the MENA region houses such surpris-
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ingly low levels of foreign investments. Note that this paper is not the rst one posing
this question. Collier and Gunning (1999) and El-Naggar (1990) pointed out the role
of property rights, the tax system, the rule of law, and economic freedom in mobiliz-
ing both foreign and domestic capital for growth and development. Meon and Khalid
(2004) investigated whether the quality of institutions limited the MENAs integration
in the world economy and their results suggested that the impact of an improvement
in the quality of institutions might result in a sensitive increase of FDI inows and
manufactured exports.
Kamaly (2002) found economic growth and the lagged value of FDI/GDP as the
only signicant determinants of FDI ows to the MENA region using a dynamic panel
model which covered the period 1990-1999. He did not consider the institutional factors
that a¤ect FDI ows to the region. Onyeiwu (2003), on the other hand, considered
both institutional and macroeconomic determinants and explored whether the stylized
determinants of FDI a¤ected FDI ows to the MENA region di¤erently. He compared
MENA countries with other developing countries by using panel regressions covering
the period 1975-1999. His ndings pointed out the importance of improvements in
trade openness and corruption/bureaucratic red tape, whereas the rate of return on
investment, infrastructures, economic growth, and ination were found to be insignicant
for FDI inows into the region.
Di¤erent from these studies, the current paper considers the possible role of stereo-
typing in the relative insignicance/infrequency of FDI in the Middle East and North
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Africa. Oxford English Dictionary denes stereotypes as preconceived and oversimpli-
ed ideas of the characteristics which typify a person, situation, etc. or attitudes based
on such preconceptions. Stereotypes are a result of a need to selectively perceive the
environment. In our context, they help the rm to understandand structure the com-
plex world around it, because they are usefulsimplications. It is a way of forming
expectations concerning certain groups of countries.
In this paper we ask how regional stereotypes impact FDI choices. To answer the
question we introduce well known elements of economics of discrimination in the discus-
sion. We draw upon the similarities between the labor market outcomes by race/gender
and FDI outcomes by regions. In particular, we deal with "statistical" discrimination
which helps us understand how di¤erences between fairly similar developing countries
can arise in inward-FDI outcomes.
The closest the FDI literature comes to in addressing this matter is in noting that
cultural di¤erences may be important for international business. Cultural distance is
perceived as a transaction cost and thus rms will prefer to undertake investments
in more culturally similar countries over comparable investments in more distant ones
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Buckley and Casson, 1998; Kogut and Singh, 1988).
Very recently, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2005) showed that lower levels of trust
between two countries -arising from cultural di¤erences based on cultural stereotypes-
led to lower international economic exchange, portfolio investments and FDI. Yet, none
of these studies had data on Middle East and North Africa since the data required was
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bilateral in nature and did not and still do not exist for a number of countries in the
MENA region.
In this paper we use the Oaxaca decomposition to explore di¤erences in FDI inows
between developing regions of the world. In doing so we bypass the necessity of using
bilateral FDI data. We use the standard FDI data from UNCTAD database that have
been widely used in many studies of the determinants of multinational activity and
add data on location specic attributes from World Development Indicators (WDI)
database. We also added armed-conict data from the Department of Peace and Conict
Research at Uppsala University and the Departments of Sociology and Political Science
and Geomatics at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
Our analysis spanning 94 developing countries from 6 di¤erent regions of the world
over the years 1990-2002 shows there are ongoing and signicant regional di¤erences in
the FDI ows, even after controlling for well know determinants of FDI location choice.
The remaining negative e¤ects faced by the MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa
indicate that either we are omitting some key variables from the specication used that
are relevant motives for FDI, and/or there are substantial "unexplained" constraints in
FDI receipts among di¤erent regions of the world.
We do emphasize that our results appear to be very robust. We carefully correct for
both country-pair specic autocorrelation as well as heteroscedasticity in our econometric
analysis. We considered di¤erent cuts of the data (with respect to openness, country
risk, GDP per capita) and our results did not change.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents an overview of some facts about
FDI in the MENA region. Sections 2 and 3 lay out a basic methodology for decomposing
FDI di¤erences between regions followed by an estimation of a simple model of regional
FDI di¤erences whose results are reported in Section 4. The last section concludes and
discusses directions for future work.
1 An overview of facts about FDI in MENA
In the past two decades, the relative importance of multinational corporations has grown.
About one quarter of world trade is intra-rm; for U.S. trade, it is above one third.
About 80 percent of U.S. exports are connected to MNCs. A widely used measure of
the scope of multinational activity is ows of foreign direct investment. The average
annual growth rate of FDI ows over the last 15 years exceeds 17 percent. In contrast,
world trade has expanded by about seven percent and world output has risen about 4.8
percent on average over this time period (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005 and
earlier years).
From 1980 to 2004 the share of developing countries in world FDI inows has in-
creased from 16% to 45%. When the growth of FDI inows is taken into consideration,
wide di¤erences across developing regions draw attention. FDI inows into Latin Amer-
ica and East Asia have shown a considerable increase from 1980 to 2004; a 15 fold
increase for the former and an astounding 40 fold increase for the latter. FDI inows
into MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa and West Asia have demonstrated almost no change in
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1980s and modest increases in 1990s compared to the leader regions. Eastern Europe,
after the fall of Berlin Wall has attracted increasing levels of FDI. Figure 1 shows these
ows from 1990 to 2002. FDI stocks in these regions have followed a similar pattern
in the recent years as shown in Figure 2. Latin America and East Asia have been the
leaders and the other regions dropped behind.
A more meaningful statistic that we can look at is the ratio of inward FDI stock
to GDP. This ratio can be interpreted as a broad indicator of the investment climate
in the di¤erent regions of the world. Table 1 shows inward FDI stock/GDP ratio from
1980 to 2000 in 5 year intervals. One striking feature of this table is the overall increase
of the ratio from 5-6% range in early 1980s to 25-30% range in year the 2000. Notice
from Table 1 one of the poorest regions in the world, Sub-Saharan Africa, attracted
substantially more FDI with respect to its size than the MENA region during the past
two decades. FDI stocks of the Middle Eastern countries -excluding North Africa- have
demonstrated the lowest growth rate among all other developing regions considered in
this study. When investigated closely, it is easily seen that the distribution of FDI in
the MENA region is not uniform either. Much of the ows is concentrated in a few
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Morocco. Libya, Kuwait,
and Yemen are the least recipients. A list of countries and regions used in this study
are given in Table 2.
Yet another set of statistics that we can examine in this context is supplied by
UNCTAD (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005 and earlier years). Two indices
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are calculated in this regard: One is the inward FDI performance index which ranks
countries by the FDI they receive relative to their economic size and the other one is the
inward potential index which captures several factors (apart from market size) expected
to a¤ect an economy´s attractiveness to foreign investors. Then an evaluation matrix is
constructed by using these indices. Front-runners are countries with high FDI potential
and performance. Above potential group involves countries with low FDI potential but
strong FDI performance. Below potential group is composed of countries with high FDI
potential but low FDI performance. Under-performers are countries with both low FDI
potential and performance.
In the 2002-2004 matrix, for example, Egypt, Syria and Yemen were the underper-
formers, Morocco was above potential, Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar and United
Arab Emirates were the front runners and Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Saudi
Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey were below potential. In almost every year the matrix was
constructed at least half of the MENA region countries showed up in the below potential
group. This is an interesting result in the sense that at least half of the countries in the
MENA region has high FDI potential but perform poorly when it comes to attracting
FDI from abroad. In what follows we shed some light on this puzzle by estimating a
simple model of regional FDI di¤erences.
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2 A simple model of regional di¤erences in FDI
The beginning of the modern economic analysis of discrimination can be traced back to
the Gary Beckers doctoral dissertation (1957) which was based on taste discrimination.
Much of the literature in labor economics has evolved from this seminal study. Taste dis-
crimination helped labor economists understand how di¤erences between equally skilled
men and women or blacks and whites can arise in the labor market. In essence, preju-
dice was modeled as a "taste" for discrimination. As interesting as it sounds, this strand
of discrimination literature is less relevant for our purposes and therefore we will not
consider that type of discrimination here. We will make use of the concept of statistical
discrimination.
The idea behind statistical discrimination in the labor literature is simple and elegant.
Firms have limited information about the skills and turnover propensity of applicants,
which creates incentives for rms to use easily observable characteristics such as race or
gender to statistically discriminate among workers. Note that the rm engages in such an
act if these characteristics are correlated with performance after controlling for all other
information available to rm. It is important to highlight that statistical discrimination
is not specic to labor market. One well known example is the common practice of
statistical discrimination by insurance companies when setting insurance premiums.
We argue that this type of discrimination may also be applicable to the regional
distribution of FDI ows around the globe. As competitive rms, multinational corpo-
rations can use statistical discrimination through stereotypes to ll in the information
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gaps that arise when the MNC cannot perfectly predict the risks and rewards associated
with entry into a foreign market. Note that there is a distinction between stereotypes
and generalizations. For example, generalizations bring together a series of observations
relating to an area or group in a simplied way. It is a generalization, for example, to say
that most athletes are healthy, but this does not imply that all athletes are. Stereotypes,
on the other hand, ascribe certain characteristics invariably to an entire group.
One way to explore di¤erences in FDI inows between developing regions of the world
and the role of stereotypes in inuencing these ows is to decompose it into "explained"
and "unexplained" components. Suppose that FDI inows to individual country i in
group 1 at time t can be written as
FDI
1it
= 1tX1it + 1it
and FDI inows to individual country j in group 2 at time t can be written as
FDI
2jt
= 2tX2jt + 2jt;
where 1t and 2tare dened so that E(u1itjX1it) = 0 and E(u2jtjX2jt) = 0:
The di¤erence in mean FDI ows for year t can be written as
FDI1t   FDI2t = (X1t  X2t)1t + (1t   2t)X2t;
where FDIrt and Xrt represent the mean FDI inows and control characteristics for
all countries in group r in year t. The rst term in this decomposition, which has come to
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be known as the Oaxaca decomposition after Oaxaca (1973), represents the "explained"
component. This is due to average di¤erences in traditional determinants of FDI location
choice. The second term is the "unexplained" component which represents di¤erences
in estimated coe¢ cients, in other words, di¤erential due to discrimination.
Note that the validity of the measure of discrimination obtained from the Oaxaca
decomposition depends largely on whether all dimensions of the problem at hand are
considered in the estimations. In our context, if there are FDI location determinants
which are left out of the regressions, then the error terms will be correlated with the
included controls and the  coe¢ cients will be a¤ected, which in turn will cause an
overestimation of discrimination. On the other hand, it can also be argued that dening
discrimination as the FDI inow di¤erential between observationally equivalent regions
underestimates the e¤ect of discrimination, since discriminatory barriers can a¤ect the
control variables, Xs in the potential host countries.
Location choice of the multinational corporation has been studied extensively in the
foreign direct investment literature. This choice is driven by a number of motives such
as market seeking (to satisfy local demand or to export markets in other countries),
raw material seeking (rms in oil, mining, plantation, and forest industries), production
e¢ ciency seeking (to utilize the factors of production in other countries that are under-
priced relative to their productivity) and knowledge seeking (to gain access to technology
or managerial expertise). Therefore, the location choice is a¤ected not only by the rms
own ideas, capabilities and strategies but also by its assessment of the investment climate
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-the set of location specic factors shaping the opportunities and incentives- in di¤er-
ent locations. From contract enforcement to the frequency of bribes paid, from labor
regulations to the customs procedures many developing countries are not very di¤erent
from each other according to the recent surveys of the World Bank. However, there are
puzzling di¤erences among these countries when it comes to the direct investments that
they get from abroad.
It is almost impossible to reect the host of nearly unquantiable social, political
and institutional factors that can a¤ect FDI, or such economic and competitiveness
factors as market access, the strength of local suppliers and the perceptions of individual
MNCs. These determinants have been discussed at length in the literature on foreign
direct investment which is too vast to be addressed here at length (Markusen (2002),
Feenstra (2003 Chapter 11) and citations therein). Using insights from this literature, in
what follows we discuss the controls that we use in our regressions. The variables that
dene the characteristics of the countries and their expected signs in our regressions are
reported in Table 3.
To account for the geographical distribution of FDI inows across developing coun-
tries we focus a number of motives. First, market seeking investment is undertaken to
satisfy local demand. Since ultimate aim of this type of investment is to access local
markets and serve them within, market size (GDP) and market growth (GDPG) of the
host economy are considered as the important determinants of the market seeking in-
vestments. We use GDP as an indicator of the market size with the expectation that
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relatively big markets attract more FDI. We also use the rate of GDP growth over the
previous 10 years as a proxy for expected economic growth. Both of these variables are
expected to exert a positive inuence on FDI ows.
Second, production e¢ ciency seeking investment is undertaken by rms adopting
vertical fragmentation strategies. Di¤erent from the market seeking investment, this
type of investment is conducted mainly to serve the home and third country markets.
Main attractors of this type of investment are trade openness (OPEN), coastal location
(SEA), unskilled labor (GDPC), the level of agricultural activity (AGR) and physical
infrastructure (TEL). We employ trade volume (exports + imports) as a share of GDP
as an indicator of trade openness and expect a positive sign. Coastal access is measured
by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the country has access to sea and
0 if landlocked. We expect a positive sign for this variable. GDP per capita is used
as an indicator of the availability of high-level skills. Production e¢ ciency seeking FDI
targets countries with cheap but reasonably productive labor forces. Therefore the
expected sign of GDPC is ambiguous. We measure the level of agricultural activity
by the share of agricultural value added in GDP. It may signal either a lower level of
industrial development and lack of business services (investment deterring) or lack of
potential competition (investments attracting). Therefore, the sign of this variable is
also ambiguous. We use the average number of telephone lines per 1,000 as an indicator
of modern information and communication infrastructure and expect a positive sign.
Third, other mainstream determinants include a variety of investment climate mea-
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sures. Social and political stability, control of corruption, government e¤ectiveness,
contract enforcement, and regulatory quality facilitate investment climates in the host
countries. We use country risk (ICRG) a composite indicator capturing some macro-
economic and other factors that a¤ect the risk perception of investors. The variable is
measured in such a way that high values indicate less risk1. We also use the previous
FDI stocks (FDIS) as a broad indicator of the attractiveness and absorptive capacity
for FDI and the investment climate. Finally, distance to armed-conict is an important
deterrent of FDI and must be included in our study. As an indicator of this measure
we use a dummy variable CONF which takes the value of 1 if the country is involved in
a major armed-conict and 0 otherwise. A major armed-conict is dened as at least
1000 battle-related deaths in a given year.
3 Econometric considerations and data
The data used in this paper are in panel form. Preliminary tests indicated that both
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity were present. Thus, we use Prais-Winsten re-
gression with panel corrected standard errors. We report results from regressions where
the autocorrelation coe¢ cient is assumed to be di¤erent for each observational unit
(country). The variance-covariance matrix is computed under the assumption that the
disturbances are heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated across units, where
each pair of cross-sectional units has their own covariance. For each element in the co-
1We ended up not using ICRG in our regressions because it was highly correlated with our
conict measure.
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variance matrix, all available observations that are common to the two units contributing
to the covariance are used to compute it, given that the panel is unbalanced.
We have an unbalanced panel because not all data are available for all years of
the sample period. Hence, when there is a gap, we limit ourselves to using post-gap
information. In other words, if 1993 is available, 1994 is missing, and 1995 onwards is
available, the data for this country starts in 1995. One of the robustness checks uses a
larger number of observations, although a minimum of ve must still be imposed in order
to allow for the computation of the autocorrelation coe¢ cients for all country pairs.
The data used includes 94 countries from 6 di¤erent developing regions of the world
between years 1990-2002. We use the standard FDI data from UNCTAD database that
have been widely used in many studies of the determinants of multinational activity
and add data on location specic attributes from World Development Indicators (WDI)
database. We also added armed-conict data from the Department of Peace and Conict
Research at Uppsala University and the Departments of Sociology and Political Science
and Geomatics at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. A list of countries
under six main developing regions -MENA, SUB-SAHARAN, E. EUROPE, LATIN, W.
ASIA and E.ASIA- is given in Table 2. Summary statistics are given in Table 3.
4 Results
Tables 4, 5a and 5b report the results. Table 4 shows the results from running a Prais-
Winsten regression as outlined above. Columns (1) and (3) report regressions of FDI
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inows on region dummies, without including any further control variables. Columns (2)
and (4) include controls for previous FDI stocks, market size and potential, skill, level of
agricultural activity, infrastructure, involvement in major armed conict, coastal access
and a time trend2. Columns (3) and (4) report the same regressions after omitting the
outliers from the sample3.
In columns (1) and (3), coe¢ cients of all the region dummies are negative and sta-
tistically signicant, which points out that all ve regions -MENA, SUB-SAHARAN, E.
EUROPE, LATIN and W. ASIA- have received lower FDI inows compared to the E.
ASIA both with and without China in the sample. When control variables are added to
the model (columns (2) and (4)), the negative e¤ect of being in certain regions of the
world either becomes less signicant or turns positive. More specically, coe¢ cients of
LATIN and E. EUROPE turns positive but lose statistical signicance once the controls
are added. In other words, being located in Latin America or in Eastern Europe does
not a¤ect the FDI inows in any way di¤erent from being located in East Asia. The
coe¢ cient of W. ASIA becomes less negative and signicant after the addition of the
controls (column 2) and once the outliers are omitted (column 4) this coe¢ cient loses
its signicance, pointing out that being located in W. ASIA does not disadvantage the
FDI receiving country in this region.
On the other hand, even though the e¤ect of being located in the MENA region and
2OPEN is not included in the regressions because of the high degree of multicolinearity it
exhibited. However, in the robustness checks the data is divided into two parts as low and
high trade opennes and qualitatively no signicant changes in the results are observed.
3China, Hong Kong, Brazil and Mexico are the biggest FDI receivers among all developing
countries.
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Sub-Saharan Africa gets smaller once the controls are added, they are still negative and
statistically signicant. Considering the statistical signicance of almost all the included
controls and the good t of the regressions, this result can be interpreted as suggestive
evidence for the existence of unexplained di¤erences among E. ASIA and MENA or
SUB-SAHARAN.
All control variables except for SEA have the expected signs and are statistically
signicant. Being involved in a major armed-conict negatively a¤ects FDI as expected,
however, it is only signicant at 10% signicance level.
We also conduct a number of robustness checks where we divide the data by trade
openness, market size, country risk and GDP per capita. The results which are not
reported here for brevity but available upon request, indicate no major changes in the
core results.
Tables 5a and 5b use the Oaxaca decomposition discussed in the previous section to
decompose changes in FDI inows in years 1990-2002 after excluding the outliers. We
look at MENA vs. all other developing countries, MENA vs. SUB-SAHARAN, MENA
vs. LATIN and MENA vs. E. ASIA. The top row of the table shows the di¤erences in
the FDI between these ve regions. The second and third rows decompose this into the
share due to di¤erences in country characteristics and di¤erences in coe¢ cients. The
rest of the rows report the detailed breakdowns.
Two general patterns are easily observable. First, when the MENA region is com-
pared to all other developing countries, Latin America and East Asia, MENA gets 43%,
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126% and 306% less FDI inows, respectively4. Only with respect to Sub-Saharan Africa,
it receives higher FDI ows. Second, the total di¤erence due to characteristics point out
that the MENA indeed receives 50% more FDI than all other developing countries, 65%
more than Latin America and 130% more than Sub-Saharan Africa. Only with respect
to East Asia it receives 40% lower FDI due to country characteristics. The negative dif-
ference due to paramaters are so big that it overshadows the positive di¤erence due to
country characteristics. In other words, unexplained di¤erences dominate the potential
the region has to o¤er.
In the lower echelons of the unexplained di¤erences reported in the bottom half of
the Tables 5a and 5b, it is clear that a large share of the coe¢ cient e¤ect comes from
the market size. In other words, returns to market potential are considerably lower in
this region. This might be a problem for countries in the MENA in attracting FDI.
Moreover, intercept term has also demonstrates big negative values which is typically
interpreted as ongoing discriminatory constraints. However, trend coe¢ cient is positive
in all comparisons pointing out a gradual improvement in discrimination over time.
There are also higher returns to coastal access compared to all other regions.
These results taken all together can be considered as suggestive evidence for ongoing
and signicant regional di¤erences in the FDI ows, even after controlling for well know
determinants of FDI location choice.
4The dependent variable, FDI stocks, GDP, GDP per capita enter the regressions in loga-
rithmic scale.
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5 Conclusion and directions for future work
Although the purchasing power is limited and technological and human resources are
scarce in the MENA region, investment opportunities exist in such areas as the extrac-
tion and processing of natural resources; tourism; manufacturing; and export-oriented
production of labor-intensive and/or natural resource-intensive manufactured products.
However, these opportunities might be dismissed easily by company executives due to
the negative image of the region. The news media reports are dominated by accounts
of war, civil unrest, and economic disorder. While such problems undoubtedly exist in
some MENA countries, it is wrong to lump all MENA countries together in a single
negative stereotype. To assess the investment potential, each opportunity needs to be
evaluated on its own merits.
Stereotypes are incomplete and inaccurate beliefs that are based on homogenizing,
distorting and over-generalizing certain characteristics possessed by the members of a
group. In this paper, we investigated the impact of regional stereotyping on inward-FDI
in the MENA region by introducing well known elements of economics of race and gender
in the labor market.
We used aggregate data covering 1990-2002 period for 94 developing countries from
6 di¤erent regions of the world. Our analysis showed there are ongoing and signicant
regional di¤erences in the FDI ows, even after controlling for determinants of FDI loca-
tion choice. The MENA region exhibited unexplained, adverse di¤erences compared to
all other regions except for Sub-Saharan Africa. This negative e¤ect faced by the MENA
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region indicates that either we are omitting some key variables from the specication
used that are relevant motives for FDI, and/or there are substantial "unexplained" con-
straints in FDI receipts among di¤erent regions of the world.
So what id the punchline? Trade and foreign direct investment are needed in the
MENA region as engines of growth and dynamism according to the MENA Development
Report (2003) by World Bank. "With more trade and investment, countries in the region
will be able to achieve faster growth, reduce poverty, create more jobs, and improve the
knowledge, skills, and the productivity of their workforce." FDI alone cannot solve the
underlying problems facing the region. However, it can play a more important part than
it currently does in the development process of the countries located in this region.
There is certainly need for further research on this topic. Relying only on the Oax-
aca measure of discrimination has potential for the abuse and misuse. In this delicate
matter, we believe that a more in-depth analysis should be in due course, which brings
us to a discussion of future work. We plan to extend this paper in a couple of directions.
First, this paper did not o¤er a theoretical analysis. Despite being simple, the regression
results reported in this paper can serve as useful insights in writing a theoretical model
of statistical discrimination in FDI location choice. Second, after completing the model
of statistical discrimination, we are planning to use the test of statistical discrimination
provided Altonji and Pierret (1997). The situation they consider can be adopted as
follows: (i). Being from a certain region of the world is negatively related to the prof-
itability of the MNC; (ii). The relation between regional origin and the protability of
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the MNC does not vary with experience; and (iii). The MNCs learn over time. The
relation between FDI and regional origin will not vary with experience if the MNCs
statistically discriminate against members of certain regions of world. If MNCs do not
statistically discriminate, then the FDI gap will widen with experience in the region.
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Table 1: Inward FDI Stock as a % of GDP  by Host Region and Economy
Region/economy 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
World 5.0 6.8 8.4 9.4 18.3
Developed countries 4.9 6.3 8.2 8.9 16.3
Developing countries 5.4 8.9 9.8 12.2 26.2
Middle East 0.1 8.2 6.5 8.2 9.1
Bahrain 2.0 10.9 13.0 41.1 74.1
Iran 3.2 3.7 2.2 2.1 2.4
Iraq -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Jordan 3.9 9.6 15.3 9.2 26.8
Kuwait 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.7
Lebanon 0.5 1.5 1.9 1.3 6.8
Oman 8.1 12.0 16.2 15.6 12.6
Qatar 1.1 1.5 1.0 5.5 10.8
Saudi Arabia -8.0 17.7 13.8 12.8 8.9
Syria 0.0 0.2 3.0 17.1 33.3
Turkey 12.9 13.8 7.4 8.8 9.6
UAE 1.4 1.8 2.2 4.2 2.0
Yemen 3.7 4.5 3.7 15.0 15.7
North Africa 8.7 10.2 13.3 15.9 17.3
Algeria 3.6 2.6 2.5 4.0 6.7
Egypt 9.9 16.4 25.6 19.7 17.7
Libya 5.0 1.8 2.4 2.5 1.4
Morocco 15.2 24.2 13.9 17.3 26.5
Sudan 0.4 0.6 0.4 1.2 12.1
Tunisia 38.2 58.5 62.0 60.8 60.0
Source: UNCTAD
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Table 2: List of countries
MENA Latin America Sub-Saharan East Asia West Asia Eastern Europe
Algeria Argentina Angola China Afghanistan Albania
Bahrain Bolivia Cameroon Hong Kong Armenia Belarus
Egypt Brazil Chad Indonesia Azerbaijan Bulgaria
Iran Chile Congo Korea Bangladesh Czech Rep.
Iraq Colombia Côte d'Ivoire Malaysia Georgia Estonia
Jordan Costa Rica Ethiopia Philippines India Hungary
Kuwait Dominican Rep.Ghana Singapore Kazakhstan Latvia
Lebanon Ecuador Kenya Thailand Kyrgyzstan Lithuania
Libya Guatemala Mali Viet Nam Nepal Moldova
Morocco Honduras Mozambique Pakistan Poland
Oman Mexico Namibia Sri Lanka Romania
Qatar Nicaragua Niger Tajikistan Russian Fed.
Saudi Arabia Panama Nigeria Turkmenistan Slovakia
Sudan Paraguay Senegal Uzbekistan Slovenia
Syria Peru Sierra Leone Ukraine
Tunisia Uruguay Somalia
Turkey Venezuela South Africa
UAE Tanzania
Yemen Uganda
Zimbabwe
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Table 3: Variables and Summary Statistics
Expected Standard
Variable Description Sign Mean Median Deviation
FDI Inward FDI ows (1995 prices) 1713 249.3 5288
FDIS FDI stocks (1995 prices) + 1119 1803 3332
GDP GDP + 7051 1432 14510
(1995 prices)
GDPC GDP per capita ? 2679 1378 4088
(1995 prices)
GDPG GDP growth + 35.15 35.14 41.31
(previous 10 years)
AGR Agricultural value/GDP ? 19.83 16.78 13.49
OPEN Trade volume/GDP + 75.26 65.25 41.66
TEL Telephone mainlines + 108.6 70.81 121.4
(per 1,000 inhabitants)
SEA Sea access + 0.766 1.000 0.424
(1= coastal, 0=landlocked)
CONF Major conict - 0.087 0.000 0.282
(1=involved, 0=not involved)
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Table 4: Prais-Winsten Regression Results:
All Sample Sample w/o Outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MENA -3.778*** -1.243*** -3.585*** -0.869***
(0.350) (0.397) (0.336) (0.368)
SUB-SAHARAN -4.479*** -1.407*** -4.287*** -1.268***
(0.259) (0.326) (0.255) (0.321)
E. EUROPE -2.598*** 0.544 -2.407*** 0.021**
(0.473) (0.471) (0.458) (0.486)
LATIN -2.228*** -0.015 -2.177*** 0.246
(0.203) (0.322) (0.192) (0.317)
W. ASIA -4.707*** -0.936*** -4.512*** -0.591
(0.505) (0.401) (0.491) (0.408)
Controls:
FDIS 0.521*** 2.650***
(0.150) (0.422)
GDP 0.563*** 0.487***
(0.072) (0.070)
GDPC 0.851*** 0.891***
(0.225) (0.213)
GDPG 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
AGR -0.080*** -0.082***
(0.011) (0.011)
TEL 0.004*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
SEA 0.266 0.245
(0.264) (0.257)
CONF -0.328* -0.325*
(0.204) (0.201)
Number of obs. 1,107 887 1,055 835
R2 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.90
Wald 2 871.8 5708 701.5 770.7
Prob > 2, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Re-
gressions correct for rst-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coe¢ cients are estimated
separately for each country pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. Outliers are China,
Hong Kong, Mexico and Brazil. See the text for details.
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Table 5a: Decomposition of Regional FDI Di¤erences
Specication MENA vs All Other MENA vs Sub-Saharan
FDI Inow Di¤erence -0.428 1.181
Amount due to
Characteristics 0.656 1.307
Coe¢ cients -1.083 -0.126
Di¤erences due to Characteristics
FDIS -0.027 0.149
GDP 0.363 0.629
GDPC -0.305 -2.900
GDPG 0.092 0.342
AGR 0.555 1.752
TEL 0.098 1.414
SEA -0.109 -0.073
CONF -0.011 -0.005
Di¤erences due to Parameters
FDIS 1.187 0.883
GDP -31.37 -25.95
GDPC -1.536 8.463
GDPG 0.468 -0.165
AGR 1.262 1.729
TEL 0.161 -1.044
SEA 29.59 29.48
CONF -0.118 -0.135
Intercept -0.803 -13.77
Trend 0.079 0.388
.
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Table 5b: Decomposition of Regional FDI Di¤erences
Specication MENA vs Latin MENA vs SE Asia
FDI Inow Di¤erence -1.258 -3.063
Amount due to
Characteristics 0.491 -0.402
Coe¢ cients -1.749 -2.661
Di¤erences due to Characteristics
FDIS -0.038 -0.384
GDP 0.296 0.341
GDPC -0.069 -0.055
GDPG 0.145 -0.346
AGR -0.019 -0.0002
TEL 0.257 0.064
SEA -0.034 0.000
CONF -0.046 -0.023
Di¤erences due to Parameters
FDIS 1.197 1.166
GDP -42.34 -10.32
GDPC 5.851 -7.354
GDPG 0.079 0.351
AGR 0.907 0.185
TEL -0.399 0.828
SEA 29.49 29.23
CONF -0.068 -0.117
Intercept 3.106 -17.42
Trend 0.426 0.785
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Figure 1: Inward FDI Flows by Region (billions of $)
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Figure 2: Inward FDI Stocks by Region (billions of $)
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